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Gender Verification Testing: Balancing the
Rights of Female Athletes with a
Scandal-Free Olympic Games
By PAMELA B. FASTIFF*
Introduction
This Note discusses the little-known controversy surrounding the
test used by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to verify the
gender of all female Olympic athletes. The IOC's reason for using the test
is to prevent men from competing in women's events.' Although this
topic has generated controversy in the medical field,2 it has been largely
ignored by the legal community. This Note discusses the constitutional
problems with the gender verification test and proposes an alternative
method for the athletes who are subjected to the test.
This Note highlights two areas of constitutional concern and sug-
gests possible alternatives. First, this Note examines a possible Fourth
Amendment violation, including a comparison of drug testing cases with
the IOC's use of gender testing, and considers issues of reasonableness,
consent, privacy, and other competing interests.
Next, this Note examines the equal protection problems posed by
gender testing. Since only women are required to take the test, this Note
will discuss the standard of review and attempt to determine if the test
violates the right of female athletes to equal protection of the laws. Ad-
ditional areas of concern beyond the scope of this Note are jurisdiction of
a United States court over the IOC and standing of an athlete to sue the
OC.3
* B.A., Wellesley College, 1987; Member, Third Year Class.
1. See infra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
2. Albert de la Chapelle, Gender Verification of Female Athletes, LANCET at 1265 (1987)
[hereinafter de la Chapelle, Gender Verification]; Albert de la Chapelle, The Use and Misuse of
Sex Chromatin Screening for Gender.Identification of Female Athletes, 256 JAMA 1920 (1986)
[hereinafter de la Chapelle, Use and Misuse of Sex Chromatin].
3. If these constitutional concerns became the subject of a lawsuit by an American ath-
lete or athletes, a major hurdle would be whether or not the IOC can even be subject to United
States jurisdiction. No court has ever directly faced that question. See generally James C.
Goettel, Note, Is the International Olympic Committee Amenable to Suit in a United States
Court?, 7 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 61-82 (1983-84) (concluding that the IOC has the legal capac-
ity to be sued, but that foreign policy considerations compel restraint). See also International
Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 288 (West 1990); Amateur Sports Act, 36
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Three possible solutions exist to the problems posed by the gender
verification test. First, continue using the current test on the theory that
the integrity of the Olympic Games is at stake. Second, abolish the test
completely in order to restore dignity to female athletes, despite the small
probability of a male athlete perpetrating fraud upon the Olympics by
competing in a women's event. Third, devise a different gender test that
examines multiple factors, including external appearance and psychologi-
cal identity, to determine an athlete's sex. This Note argues that the last
approach is the fairest to the athletes, yet still provides the IOC with a
practical way in which to ensure the separation of men and women in the
Olympic Games.
I. The Olympic Gender Verification Test
Since 1968 the International Olympic Committee has required all
female competitors to submit to a gender verification test prior to com-
peting in the Olympic Games.4 The IOC decided to use the test5 in re-
U.S.C.A. §§ 371-393 (West 1988); International Olympic Committee Charter rule 23, cited in
Goettel, supra, at 65 n.26; RESTATEMENT THIRD OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 301 (nonbinding agreements), § 302 (treaties and international agreements
subject to prohibition of Bill of Rights), § 321 (implication that international obligations sur-
vive restrictions imposed by domestic law) (1987).
For case law on this subject, see DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp.
1181 (D.D.C. 1980) (The court decided that the United States Olympic Committee was not a
state actor when, under pressure from the Carter Administration, it decided not to send a team
to the Moscow Summer Olympics. The court also concluded that the USOC is bound by the
rules and regulations of the IOC.); Martin v. International Olympic Comm., 740 F.2d 670 (9th
Cir. 1984) (The court denied plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction to require the IOC
to include certain events for women already offered for men because plaintiffs failed to demon-
strate a fair chance of success on the merits of their gender discrimination claim. Therefore,
the court did not reach the issue of amenability to suit.); Liang Ren-Guey v. Lake Placid 1980
Olympic Games, Inc., 424 N.Y.S.2d 535, aff'd, 403 N.E.2d 178 (1980) (refusing to become
involved in the "two Chinas" problem because of the political ramifications, the court thus did
not reach the question of jurisdiction but referred to the IOC as having final authority on all-
questions concerning the Olympic Games); United States Olympic Comm. v. International
Sports Marketing, Inc., 737 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that the IOC Charter is not a
treaty ratified in accordance with constitutional requirements).
Related to the question of jurisdiction is the issue of standing of American athletes, either
by themselves or by USOC representation, to sue the IOC in a United States court. The re-
quirements for standing are specifically spelled out in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975),
and cases cited therein.
4. Paul Majendie, Hurry for Your Sex Test, Says Gender Verification Doctor, REuTERS
LIBRARY REPORT, Sept. 16, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File.
5. Prior to the World Track and Field Championships held in August 1991 in Japan, the
International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF), which is the governing body for track and
field, decided not to use the gender verification test. Instead, the IAAF required that each
team's physician perform a medical exam of the female athletes prior to competition. See
Gary Caruso, Physical Exam to Determine Sex of Athletes, NAT'L SPORTS DAILY, June 6,
1991, at 13. This new test was criticized as an inappropriate procedure for a team doctor to
perform. David Powell, Sex Tests Cause Complaint, TIMES NEvsPAPERs, Aug. 21, 1991,
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sponse to "rumors of men masquerading as women and 'women who
were not really women' competing in the Games." 6 The IOC's rationale
for separating men and women in most events is to allow for a matching
of persons of equal strength7 "to prevent unfair competition."' History
has recorded two examples of athletes, competing before the test was
required, who were thought to be women and later assumed to be men.9
One athlete who actually won medals in the 1964 Olympics was later
discovered to be a man when a medical commission composed entirely of
men detected the presence of a male, or Y, chromosome.10 However,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, TTIMES File; Peter Hildreth, Athletics: Britain to Oppose
New Sex Testing Formula For Tokyo, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Aug. 4, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, TELEGR File; New Sex Test at Track Meets, CH. TRiB., July 31,
1991, at 3. The National Sports Daily also reported that in light of the IAAF's actions, the
IOC was considering adopting a similar gender verification test. Caruso, supra.
As of September 19, 1991, the IOC had "shelved" the possibility of replacing the gender
verification test with a medical exam. However, such a test will be used in the future "where
the sex of a female athlete [is] in severe doubt." IOC Shelves Idea of Compulsory Physical Sex
Tests, REUTERS LIBRARY REPORT, Sept. 19, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REU-
TER File; Telephone Interview with Don Catlin, M.D., United States representative to the
IOC Medical Commission (Oct. 2, 1991).
For the 1992 Winter Olympics in Albertville, France, a new test was proposed to replace
the buccal smear/cheek scraping test. Id See infra note 15. A blood test was to be performed
on all female athletes to determine if they were genetically female. Ideally, the same type of
information about sex chromosomes is detected in blood as it is in skin cells. Id The blood
test, however, is imperfect. Dr. Catlin stated that he was told by gender specialists that the
flaws in the blood test are equivalent to the flaws in the buccal smear test. Id See M.A.
Ferguson-Smith, Olympic Row Over Sex Testing, 355 NATURE 10 (Jan. 2, 1992) (the author
argues that a test for Y-specific DNA ("polymerase" method) is just as bad, in response to
Christopher Anderson, Olympic Row Over Sex Testing, 353 NATURE 784 (Oct. 31, 1991).
However, the suggested blood test was not used. Instead, the IOC employed a similar
cheek scraping test. "Like its predecessor, known as the Barr test, the Dingeon method [or
polymerase method] screens for anomalies by laboratory analysis of cell samples scraped from
the inside of a competitor's mouth." Paul Holmes, Olympic Chiefs Brush Off Sex Test Storm,
THE REUTERS LIBRARY REPORT, Jan. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REU-
TER File. "Dingeon's procedure looks for the presence of the male 'Y' chromosone [sic] while
the Barr test checked the 'double-X' female chromosome." Id The French medical associa-
tion claimed the Dingeon test is "intrusive and unreliable." John Powers, Can't Drive to this
Albertville; The Olympics, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 2, 1992, at 68. In essence, therefore,
nothing has changed.
6. Alison Carlson, When is a Woman Not a Woman?, WOMEN'S SPORTS & FITNESS,
Mar. 1991, at 26; Lori Ewing, Gender Testing Unfair, CALGARY HERALD, Jan. 12, 1992, at F6
("The incidence of men masquerading as women in sport is negligible.").
7. Experts Say Competitive Advantage Holds for MD Tennis Star Despite Sex Change,
MED. TRiB., Sept. 22, 1976, at 37.
8. Carlson, supra note 6, at 28.
9. See infra note 184 and accompanying text. Additionally, an Austrian ski racer who
competed as a woman was discovered to be a man in the late 1960s after fathering a child.
Barr, When it Comes to Drugs, Alpine Ski Racers are 'Clean' UNITED PRESS INT'L, Feb. 6,
1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
10. Lisa M. Bassis, Note, A Legal Conundrum-Transsexuals in Athletics, 1 COMM/ENT
369, 371 (1977). See infra note 184 and accompanying text. This one known incident,
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
since 1968 when the test was first used, no imposter has ever been discov-
ered attempting to compete in the Olympics.11
The gender verification test, also known as the "Barr body test"12 or
the "sex chromatin test,"13 seeks to identify genetic males, such as
transsexuals, and females with chromosomal disorders that allegedly give
them an unfair advantage.1 4  The test consists of a buccal smear taken
from the inside of the athlete's mouth. The sample is then examined for
the requisite XX female sex chromosome. 5 If the correct chromosomes
are present, the athlete is issued a femininity card 6 and is then allowed
to compete.' 7 If anything other than XX chromosomes appears, or if the
test results are inconclusive, further testing is done, including a gyneco-
logical exam. 8 Although the IOC does not release the results of the test,
no one has ever failed the test because they were discovered to be a man
masquerading as a woman.1 9
The test's value is questionable. If neither a transsexual nor a man
masquerading as a woman has ever been caught by the test, why does the
although arguably relevant for the retention of the gender verification test, does not justify its
retention in light of the relevant constitutional considerations.
11. Larry Doyle, Doctors Hit Olympic Sex Testing, UNrrED PRESS INT'L, Oct. 10; 1986,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
12. Dianne Klein, Sex Must Be Explicit at the XXIII Olympic Games, UNrrED PRESS
INT'L, July 30, 1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
13. Gender Testfor Athletes Called into Question, REuTERs LTD., Oct. 10, 1986, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File.
14. Doyle, supra note 11.
15. See de la Chapelle, The Use and Misuse of Sex Chromatin, supra note 2, at 1921;
Description of Femininity Test as received from the United States Olympic Committee (on file
with the author). A buccal smear is a scraping of the inside of a person's mouth for a sample
of skin cells. For a description of the genetic makeup of male sex chromosomes, see infra note
34 and accompanying text.
16. SEC Commissioner Tops List for Olympic Post, CHi. TRuB., Oct. 14, 1987, at 3.
17. Majendie, supra note 4.
18. Bassis, supra note 10, at 382; see de la Chapelle, Use and Misuse of Sex Chromatin,
supra note 2, at 1920-21. Both articles cite the International Olympic Committe Medical Con-
trols for the Montreal Olympics in 1976 and the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984. The pertinent
sections of the medical controls are:
1. As a screening test, the determination of X and Y chromatin will be con-
ducted on a smear of buccal mucous membrane.
2. If the test is inconclusive, the competitor must undergo further tests as de-
termined by the IOC Medical Commission.
3. Should the results of these tests require it ... a physical examination can be
prescribed and performed by a physician gynecologist member of or accepted by the
Medical Commission.
4. The Medical Commission will issue a femininity certificate to those compet-
itors whose test results are conclusive.
The same controls were used at the Seoul Olympics in 1988. No changes are anticipated
for the future. Telephone Interview with Bob Beeten, Sports Medicine Division of the USOC
(Jan. 28, 1991).
19. De la Chapelle, Use and Misuse of Sex Chromatin, supra note 2, at 1920.
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IOC persist in using it?2" Does the integrity of the Olympic Games as an
international showcase for athletic ability outweigh the possible Fourth
Amendment violations and potential invasion of privacy? Should an ath-
lete who knows she is female allow a simple laboratory test to label her as
an acceptable female? Female athletes take the test readily.2 This com-
pliance may be the reason for the lack of legal controversy regarding the
IOC's use of the test. In reality, however, an athlete who has trained
most of her life to compete in the Olympics is not going to let a simple
test get in her way. The female athletes' compliance and the lack of legal
controversy, however, do not mean the test is constitutionally valid. In
view of the potential constitutional violations, the IOC must have a legit-
imate interest in continuing to employ the test.22 To determine if such an
interest exists, the history of gender verification in sports must be
examined.
H. Gender Verification in Sports - Origins of the Problem
A. The Renee Richards Controversy
Dr. Renee Richards is a male-to-female transsexual who was a na-
tionally ranked tennis player on the men's tour before her sex change
operation in 1975. In 1976 she attempted to enter the United States Ten-
nis Open as a woman and was told she had to pass the gender verification
test in order to qualify 3 Until August 1976 the United States Tennis
Association (USTA) had not used a gender verification test. a
Richards challenged the use of the test, claiming the USTA insti-
tuted it only after learning of her sex change operation.25 She claimed
that the USTA's decision to use the test was specifically to prevent her
from playing in the Open. Additionally, she claimed that the medical
community regarded the test as "insufficient, grossly unfair, inaccurate,
faulty and inequitable. 2 z6
Judge Ascione of the New York Superior Court agreed with Rich-
ards. He stated that it was clear that the USTA purposefully instituted
the test, knowing that Richards would fail, to prevent her from playing
in the Open. 7 Judge Ascione further stated that the only valid reason
for employing the gender verification test in the athletic arena is "to pre-
20. "To date, about a dozen women in the Olympics have been banned for life from com-
petition for not being sufficiently feminine." Carlson, supra note 6, at 26 (emphasis added).
See also Hildreth, supra note 5. These women failed the gender test because of chromosomal
abnormalities, not because they were men masquerading as women.
21. Majendie, supra note 4.
22. See infra notes 166-74 and accompanying text.




27. Id. at 272.
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vent fraud, i.e., men masquerading as women, competing against wo-
men."2 In other words, the test could not be used to eliminate a
transsexual, such as Richards. Finally, without striking down the gender
verification test because of its recognized acceptance2 9 in determining
sex, he held that it should not be considered as the sole criterion30 if
circumstances warrant consideration of other factors.31
The Richards decision is the only case that discusses and rules on
the gender verification test. It is an unequivocal statement that the pur-
pose of the test is to prevent fraud, which has never occured at the
Olympic Games as long as the test has been used.32 The decision also
points out that chromosomes should not be considered alone when deter-
mining gender; other criteria are of equal importance, such as psycholog-
ical identity (which gender the individual perceives him or herself to be),
and apparent gender (which gender society views that individual to be).33
It is this latter point, that chromosomes should not be considered alone,
which serves as a starting point for questioning the IOC's use of the gen-
der verification test, and perhaps replacing it with a new test that consid-
ers all the criteria.
B. The Legal Definition of Sex
A genetically normal female has XX sex chromosomes, while a ge-
netically normal male has XY sex chromosomes.34 Genetic aberrations
exist, however, that may give an individual an ambiguous gender sta-
tus. 35 Consequently, the medical community has devised a way to deter-
mine a person's sexual status by using a list of eight criteria.36 No one
criterion is more important than any other, and each is weighed equally
28. Id.
29. Id. at 272-73 ("acceptable tool for determining sex").
30. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
31. Richards, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 273. The decision suggests that other factors should be
carefully weighed. In Richards the judge considered the USTA's intent in requiring Dr. Rich-
ards take the test. Id. at 272. The court also weighed the medical evidence which attested to
Dr. Richards' sexual identity as a female. Id at 271-72.
32. Doyle, supra note 11.
33. Richards, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 270-72.
34. Bassis, supra note 10, at 373 n.20 (citing J. MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF THE BODY 15-21
(1968)).
35. Bassis, supra note 10, at 374 n.22 (citing J. MONEY & A. EHRHARDT, MAN AND
WOMAN, BOY AND GIRL 29-35 (1972)).
36. The eight criteria include the following:
[Vol. 19:937
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when used to determine a person's SeX. 37
The legal community has embraced these criteria for defining sex.
In M. T v. J.T,8 the New Jersey Superior Court held that a male-to-
female transsexual was a female for marital purposes.3 9 In support of its
decision, the court stated that "there are several criteria or standards
which may be relevant in determining the sex of an individual."'  The
court emphasized the importance of a person's emotional sense of sexual
identity. 1 The court further stated that because "certain regulated
sports activities" require sex differentiation, more than one type of test
may be important.42
In Anonymous v. Mellon, the court refused to order the plaintiffs
birth record changed to reflect the fact that she was a female as a result
of a sex change operation.43 The court cited Richards, however, to sup-
port its conclusion that no one factor is determinative of a person's sex.'
In fact, the court went so far as to state that "basing determination of
gender upon any one indicator might well lead to an unwarranted
conclusion., 45
Other courts and commentators state that all eight criteria must be
considered, but that a person's psychological sense of gender identity
may be the most important criterion." How a person perceives him or
herself may be of more value than physiology.47
1. sex chromosome constitution
2. sex hormonal pattern
3. gonadal sex (testes or ovaries)
4. internal sex organs
5. external genitalia
6. secondary sexual characteristics
7. apparent sex (as presumed by others and, consequently, the role in which a
person is reared)
8. psychological sex or gender identity (that which a person presumes him or
herself to be)
See Bassis, supra note 10, at 374; Edward S. David, Comment, The Law and Transsexualism:
A Faltering Response to a Conceptual Dilemma, 7 CONN. L. REv. 288, 290-91 (1974-75).
37. Anonymous v. Mellon, 398 N.Y.S.2d 99, 102 (1977). The Richards decision focused
on Dr. Richards' sexual identity, which may indicate that that factor is more important than
the rest of the criteria.
38. 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
39. Id at 211.
40. I d at 208. Among the criteria, the court included anatomical sex and psychological
sex. Id. at 207.
41. Id at 209.
42. Id
43. 398 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1977).
44. Id. at 101.
45. Id
46. Richards v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267, 271-72 (1977); In re Anon-
ymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834, 838 (1968); David, supra note 36, at 292.
47. In re Anonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834; David, supra note 36, at 292.
Spring 1992]
944 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 19:937
The legal community's acceptance of the eight criteria for determin-
ing sex underscores the arbitrariness of the 10C's use of the gender verifi-
cation test. By using only sex chromosomes to define sex, the IOC is
arbitrarily choosing to ignore several other equally important factors.
Not only is the IOC method contrary to that which is espoused by the
legal community, but it has also come under attack in the medical com-
munity, which derides the gender verification test as fundamentally un-
sound and unfair.4"
C. Medical Criticism of the Test
Medical experts consider the gender verification test to be inaccurate
and unfair.4 9 According to Drs. Albert de la Chapelle and Joe Simpson,
the purpose of screening all female athletes is to exclude from women's
events males or other individuals whose muscle strength or body build
provides them with an unfair competitive advantage over other geneti-
cally correct women.50 Both doctors believe the sex chromosome screen-
ing method to be inaccurate and discriminatory because it identifies
women with genetic defects who have no muscular advantage, while at
the same time misses individuals who do have such an advantage. 5' For
instance, Dr. de la Chapelle claims that the sex chromosome test will not
reveal women who have taken hormones to increase their muscular
strength.5" Certain other women are treated unfairly by the test simply
because they were born with abnormal genetic conditions. Such women
might not have the requisite XX chromosomes, but have female body
proportions, female external genitalia, female muscle strength, and a fe-
male psychological and social condition.53 In every sense, other than ge-
netic makeup, these people are female. Because of their abnormal sex
chromosomes, however, they will not be allowed to compete even though
they have no advantage over their competition. De la Chapelle claims to
have had "personal experience" with women belonging to this category
who have been denied a career in sports because they did not possess the
correct genetic make-up.54
To further illustrate the unfairness of the test, certain types of genet-
ically abnormal "males" would pass as "females" and would be allowed
to compete. Normal males have XY sex chromosomes.55 A man born
48. De la Chapelle, Use and Misuse of Sex Chromatin, supra note 2, at 1920; Joe L. Simp-
son, Gender Testing in the Olympics, 256 JAMA 1983 (1986).
49. De la Chapelle, Use and Misuse of Sex Chromatin, supra note 2, at 1920.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1923; Simpson, supra note 48, at 1983.
52. De la Chapelle, Use and Misuse of Sex Chromatin, supra note 2, at 1921.
53. Id. at 1922.
54. Id.; see also Carlson, supra note 6, at 28; David Miller, Women Caught in Gender
Trap, TIMEs NEWSPAPERS, Nov. 6, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, TrIMES File.
55. De la Chapelle, Use and Misuse of Sex Chromatin, supra note 2, at 1922.
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with a genetic abnormality of XXY 6 would pass the test as a female,
although the Y chromosome identifies him as a man.57 A man born with
XX sex chromosomes"8 would also pass the test because he has no Y
chromosome to identify him as male. 9 Both XXY and XX males may
have a normal male body build, male muscle strength, and a male psy-
chological and social orientation.'
One of the IOC's prime concerns is to match people of equal
strength by preventing men from competing against women. 1 If a male
athlete who was aware of his genetic defect attempted to compete in a
women's event, what would the IOC officials do? Presumably, their first
reaction would be to say that he looks like a male so he must be male
and, therefore, cannot compete in a women's event. Suppose our hypo-
thetical male, knowing of his genetic abnormality, submitted to the gen-
der verification test. He would pass! The IOC only considers
chromosomes when determining sex, so theoretically this man could
compete in a women's event.
Although this scenario is very remote, it illustrates that the test does
not serve the purpose for which the IOC employs it. Because a geneti-
cally abnormal "male" would pass the test, and a genetically abnormal
"female" with no competitive advantage whatsoever would fail, the test
is indeed inaccurate and unfair.
Proponents of the test might counter that this scenario is so remote
that it really does not affect the validity of the test. If such scenarios are
indeed remote, however, why have the test at all? Are men really going
to try to compete in women's events in the Olympics? It is not likely.
If the test is not needed, yet is retained, the next step to consider is
whether the gender verification test imposes constitutional problems. As
the following analysis will show, the IOC must demonstrate a protectable
interest that outweighs Fourth Amendment and equal protection con-
cerns to justify retention of the test.
I. Constitutional Concerns
A. The Fourth Amendment
L State Action
In order to bring a cause of action under the Fourth Amendment,
the plaintiff must allege that the offending party was operating under
56. A male with XXY chromosomes has "Kinefelter's syndrome." Id.
57. I
58. This is known as "XX male syndrome." Id
59. I d; de ]a Chapelle, Gender Verification, supra note 2, at 1266.
60. De la Chapelle, Use and Misuse of Sex Chromatin, supra note 2, at 1922.
61. Experts Say Competitive Advantage Holds for MD Tennis Star Despite Sex Change,
supra note 7, at 37.
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color of state law.62 In National Collegiate Athletic Association v.
Tarkanian, the Supreme Court held that the NCAA is not a state ac-
tor.63 The Court pointed out that the NCAA's rules," which influenced
the University of Nevada's decision to suspend Jerry Tarkanian, were
independent of any particular state." The University's decision to adopt
the NCAA's recommendations was not sufficient to show that the
NCAA was acting under color of state law. 6
Based on this decision, the IOC would probably not be a state actor,
since the NCAA is the closest comparison to the IOC. However, it may
be possible to find state action if the United States Olympic Committee
(USOC) is targeted as the offending party. In San Francisco Arts and
Athletics v. United States Olympic Committee,67 the Supreme Court held
that the USOC was not a state actor.6 8 The Court stated that the USOC
remained a private actor, even though it was extensively regulated by
Congress.69 Additionally, "[n]either the conduct nor the coordination of
amateur sports has been a traditional governmental function."70 In his
dissent, Justice Brennan argued that "[t]he USOC performs a distinctive,
traditional governmental function [because] it represents this Nation to
the world community."'" He stated that Congress had "[p]atently...
endowed the USOC with traditional governmental powers that enable it
to perform a governmental function."72 Justice Brennan also wrote
about the effect of the Olympics when he stated that "[e]very aspect of
the Olympic pageant... reinforces the national significance of Olympic
participation."7 " "[I]n the eye of the public.., the connection between
the decisions of the United States Government and those of the United
States Olympic Committee is profound."'74 Justice Brennan believed the
62. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721-22 (1961); Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961).
63. 488 U.S. 179, 193-95 (1988).
64. The rule violations at issue were recruiting violations. Id. at 185.
65. Id. at 193. The NCAA has a membership of "several hundred other public and pri-
vate member institutions .... ." Id.
66. Id. at 195.
67. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
68. The USOC was established under federal law. 36 U.S.C.A. § 1101(46) (West 1988).
Congress granted the USOC a corporate charter, id. § 371, and imposed certain requirements
on it. For example, it must remain apolitical, id. § 377, and report its operations and expendi-
tures of grant money to Congress, id. § 382(a).
69. SFAA, 483 U.S. at 544.
70. Id. at 545.
71. Id. at 550.
72. Id. at 549. In a footnote, Justice Brennan argued that the Court had never expressly
limited the definition of a government function as a function "'traditionally the exclusive pre-
rogative' of the government." Id. at 549-50 n.1 (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 551.
74. Id. at 557.
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USOC was a state actor because of the obvious connection between the
USOC and the United States government.
Although current Supreme Court law does not consider the USOC
or the NCAA a state actor, California law has gone the other direction.
In Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,7" the Court of Appeal
found that the California constitutional guarantee of privacy76 reached
both governmental and non-governmental conduct.77 Since the NCAA
had already been found to be a private actor in Tarkanian,78 it was re-
quired to show a compelling interest79 in testing student-athletes for drug
use because " '[p]rivacy is protected not merely against state action; it is
considered an inalienable right ... . "'1 Because the court relied on
privacy grounds rather than Fourth Amendment grounds, the NCAA
had a heavier burden.81 The court stated that Fourth Amendment analy-
sis requires a balancing of the intrusion against a legitimate governmental
interest.8 2 In a privacy analysis, the government must show that its in-
terest is compelling, and this is more difficult than Fourth Amendment
analysis, which requires only a showing of a legitimate governmental
interest.8 3
The IOC is not a state, but it acts in a similar fashion because of its
control over American athletes in the Games. Furthermore, the rules
promulgated by the IOC Executive Board are not statutes, but they func-
tion in an analagous manner. The IOC is the governing body for the
Olympics." It alone has the power to make the rules and regulations
that control the Games." All Olympic athletes, therefore, are required
to abide by the IOC's rules. It has "coercive power"8 6 and its "regula-
tion of [Olympic] athletics is a traditionally exclusive prerogative ....,,7
Based on Tarkanian and San Francisco Arts and Athletics, neither
the NCAA or the USOC is a state actor for purposes of Fourth Amend-
ment analysis. Most likely, the IOC is not a state actor either. However,
75. 273 Cal. Rptr. 402 (Ct. App. 1990), review granted, 801 P.2d 1070 (Cal. 1990).
76. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
77. Hill, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
78. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988). See supra notes
63-66 and accompanying text.
79. Hill, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
80. Id at 408 (quoting Porten v. University of San Francisco, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (Cal.
App. 1976)).
81. Id at 410.
82. Id.
83. Id
84. "The IOC is the final authority on all questions concerning the Olympic Games and
the Olympic movement." IOC Charter rule 23, cited in Goettel, supra note 2, at 65-66 n.26.
85. Goettel, supra note 3, at 65-66.
86. O'Halloran v. University of Washington, 679 F. Supp. 997, 1002 (W.D. Wash. 1988),
rev. on other grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988).
87. Id.
Spring 19921
948 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 19:937
the USOC might be held to the same privacy analysis as the NCAA was
in Hill if the Olympics were held in California. The USOC would then
have to show a compelling interest in the gender verification test that
would outweigh the privacy guarantee. As shown above, the IOC would
not be able to show such an interest. The effect of Hill is to alleviate the
state action problem and make the USOC, and probably the IOC, an-
swerable to the California constitutional guarantee of privacy.
2. Search and Seizure
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution expressly guarantees
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures ... ."I' In Katz v.
United States, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects "people, not places."89 However, the Court included an important
caveat: "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."9
Therefore, a person's physiognomy would not be protected because as
she walks down the street she is "knowingly" exposing herself to public
scrutiny. In order to invoke Fourth Amendment protection, an individ-
ual must establish that (1) there was no warrant (no probable cause); (2)
the search was unreasonable; and (3) consent was not procured.91
Although no court has addressed whether the gender verification
test satisfies the Fourth Amendment, courts have considered drug testing
of employees and of athletes. Most notably, the Court's decisions in
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association92 and National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab93 upheld the government's right to impose
blood and urine tests on, respectively, railroad employees and Customs
Service agents.
In Skinner, the Court held that the government's drug testing pro-
gram was an administrative search.94 The government's interest in regu-
lating the conduct of railroad employees, however, presented a special
need that went beyond law enforcement and justified a departure from
normal warrant and probable cause requirements.9" Here, the govern-
88. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
89. 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
90. Id.
91. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (cited in Allison Rose, Com-
ment, Mandatory Drug Testing of College Athletes: Are Athletes Being Denied Their Constitu-
tional Rights?, 16 PEPP. L. REv. 45, 59 (1988)).
92. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
93. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
94. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621 n.5
95. "When faced with such special needs, we have not hesitated to balance the govern-
mental and privacy interests to assess the practicality of the warrant and probable cause re-
quirements in the particular context." Id. at 619.
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ment was concerned about railroad safety and, in particular, drug and
alcohol use by employees when on the job. The Court admitted that
when the balance of interests precludes a showing of probable cause,
there must be individualized suspicion. No such requirement was needed
in Skinner, however, because the Court deemed the employees' privacy
interests minimal. Furthermore, the government interest in administer-
ing drug tests immediately following an accident would be jeopardized by
requiring individualized suspicion. Therefore, in this particular context,
the search was reasonable and outweighed privacy concerns because the
government's interest in testing was compelling.96
In Von Raab, the Court upheld the government's right to impose
drug tests on Customs agents who carried firearms or handled classified
material.9 7 As in Skinner, the Court explained that although this was an
administrative search, probable cause was not necessary when "the Gov-
ernment seeks to prevent the development of hazardous conditions or to
detect violations that rarely generate articulable grounds for searching
any particular place or person."98 The government has a compelling in-
terest in ensuring the safety and integrity of the borders.9 9 This interest,
which allows the government to conduct suspicionless searches, out-
weighs the Customs agents' privacy interests.10°
In both Skinner and Von Raab, the government was able to demon-
strate a compelling interest for imposing the drug tests that outweighed
the employees' privacy interests. The IOC, however, cannot prove a
compelling interest. Since the IOC does not release the results of the
gender verification test,101 it does not have the facts on its side to justify
using the test. Justice Scalia, who dissented in Von Raab, objected to
what he saw as the non-existence of "real evidence of a real problem that
will be solved by urine testing .... -10 The IOC cannot point to even
one instance of a man masquerading as a woman who managed to com-
pete in the Olympics since the test was instituted. Although proponents
of the test might argue that this is precisely why the test should remain
intact, search and seizure doctrine requires the government to prove its
need before implementing the invasive procedure.0 3
96. Id at 628.
97. 489 U.S. at 677.
98. Id at 668 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 672.
100. Id at 668.
101. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
102. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 681 (1989) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Justice Scalia said that the Customs Service rules were "a kind of immolation
of privacy .... ." Id. The government, he said, was unable to present "even a single instance in
which any of the speculated horribles actually occurred. . . ." Id. at 683.
103. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1988) (discussing
the warrant/probable cause requirement); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513
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Although both Skinner and Von Raab concern drug testing of em-
ployees, they represent the highest authority regarding when the govern-
ment can impose drug tests without fulfilling the probable cause
requirement of an administrative search. The IOC tests athletes, how-
ever, not employees, so analysis of drug testing cases involving athletes is
warranted.
In O'Halloran v. University of Washington, 'I a student-athlete chal-
lenged the NCAA's drug testing program.105 The court decided two
Fourth Amendment issues: (1) whether a urine test constitutes a search,
and (2) if it is a search, whether a reasonable expectation of privacy is
infringed.106 The court held that a urine test was a search, but that it did
not infringe on the athlete's privacy. 107 The court found that the test was
reasonable in light of a student-athlete's diminished expectation of pri-
vacy.10 8 The court stressed that in a university athletic program there is
"an element of communal undress,"'0 9 and a concern for the health of
the student athletes."o Additionally, the court found that the University
of Washington and the NCAA had a "compelling interest""' in the
health and safety of the athletes" 2 and in the integrity of athletic compe-
titions.' 3 The NCAA was able to support its interest with factual evi-
dence that the use of drugs by college athletes was indeed a problem." 4
The court concluded that the interests of the University of Washington
and the NCAA outweighed the relatively small compromise of
privacy. 11
The Seventh Circuit upheld a high school's drug testing program in
Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp. "I There, the plaintiff objected
to a urine test required by the school district for all students who partici-
(D.N.J. 1986) (same). See infra notes 132-43 and accompanying text, for a discussion of inva-
sive procedures.
104. 679 F. Supp. 997 (W.D. Wash. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir.
1988).
105. Id. at 998.
106. Id. at 1002.
107. Id.
108. Id. "[O]f primary importance is the health and safety of the student-athlete and the
ideal of fair and equitable competitions." Id. at 1003.
109. Id. at 1005.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1002.
112. Id. at 1003.
113. Id.
114. "The NCAA's grounds for suspicion are past incidents of improper drug use by ath-
letes." Id. at 1004.
115. Id. at 1002. "[T]he interest in testing is great and benefits redound to the student-
athlete as well when competitions are fair, peer pressure and temptations to use drugs are
reduced, and their health is protected." Id. at 1006.
116. 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
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pated in interscholastic sports.1 17 The court found a urine test to be a
search because of the reasonable expectation of privacy associated with
passing one's urine.11 The court, however, found the search to be rea-
sonable in light of the strict guidelines and procedures the school fol-
lowed. First, the precise program employed by the school district
minimalized embarrassment to the student-athletes by not actually moni-
toring their urination. Second, the school district maintained that the
program was only for students participating in interscholastic sports.
Furthermore, a positive result would not require a student to be expelled
or suspended. The school district had a "substantial" '119 interest in main-
taining a drug-free athletic program, and the district could not have used
less restrictive measures. 120 In addition, because the students had volun-
tarily chosen to participate in a regulated off-campus activity, they had a
diminished expectation of privacy. 121 Because of these strict guidelines
and procedures, the court ruled that the test was not unreasonable, and
therefore constitutional.
122
O'Halloran and Schaill illustrate that drug testing in athletic compe-
titions is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. In the California
case Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,1 23 however, the court
decided in favor of the athletes who objected to the NCAA's drug test.124
In formulating his decision, Judge Premo weighed the athletes' right to
privacy against the NCAA's failure to prove that a "compelling" reason
existed for violating those rights. 125 Judge Premo based his decision on
the guaranteed right to privacy in the California Constitution, which was
"intended to reach governmental and nongovernmental conduct." 126
The decision was not made on Fourth Amendment grounds. In Califor-
nia, a privacy interest is balanced against a compelling government inter-
est because it "places a heavier burden on [the proponent] than would a
Fourth Amendment privacy analysis." '12 7 In a Fourth Amendment anal-
ysis, the intrusion is balanced against the "promotion of legitimate gov-
ermental interests." 128 The California Supreme Court has granted
review of the Hill decision. 129
117. Id. at 1311.
118. Id at 1311-12.
119. Id at 1322.
120. Id
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1321-22.
123. 273 Cal. Rptr. 402 (Ct. App. 1990), review granted, 801 P.2d 1070 (Cal. 1990).
124. Id. at 422.
125. Id. at 410.
126. Id. at 408.
127. Id. at 410.
128. Id.
129. Review was granted Dec. 20, 1990. 801 P.2d 1070 (Cal. 1990).
Spring 1992]
952 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 19:937
Based on O'Halloran and Schaill, the central issues in the drug test-
ing cases are (1) does the test qualify as a search, and (2) if so, does the
government have a compelling interest that outweighs the athletes' ex-
pectation of privacy? If question two is answered in the affirmative, the
test is deemed constitutional.
Whether the need for the drug test is "compelling" or "substantial"
is unclear, as shown by the decisions above. Neither O'Halloran or
Schaill explicitly states which standard the courts are using. Instead,
terms of art, such as "compelling" and "substantial" are used at random
without any indication that they are actual standards that the court is
following.13° The Supreme Court held in both Skinner and Von Raab
that when drug testing employees, the government's interest was "com-
pelling"13 when balanced against the employees' privacy interests. Like
the lower courts, the Supreme Court did not explicity state that "compel-
ling" was the appropriate interest the government had to show in drug
testing cases,1 32 but used the term consistently enough to indicate that
that was the level of interest required.
The appropriate standard for gender verification testing is "compel-
ling." The gender verification test is an invasion of personal liberties and
is replete with privacy interests. The integrity of an individual's body is a
valid interest.1 33 Other cases have held that infringements of personal
liberty such as forced blood tests,134 and compelled surgery135 are in-
stances where a careful analysis must be made to determine if the govern-
ment should be allowed to proceed.
The circumstances in O'Halloran, in which the Court used a com-
pelling interest standard, are more closely related to those of the IOC.
The plaintiffs in O'Halloran were collegiate athletes; the plaintiffs in
Schaill were high school athletes. Olympic athletes are more like col-
legiate athletes in age, years of experience, and training. Fourth
Amendment analysis must be applied to gender verification testing. The
first question to address is whether a buccal smear, in which an athlete
opens her mouth and an instrument is inserted to scrape tissue from the
inside of her upper jaw, qualifies as a search?136 Although a bodily fluid,
such as urine or blood, is not being extracted, an instrument is placed
130. Hill clearly requires a "compelling" reason, but in a privacy, not a Fourth Amend-
ment, context.
131. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S 602, 628, 633 (1989); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 672, 674, 679 (1989).
132. Words such as "compelling," "substantial," and "rational basis" are used for specific
tests in equal protection issues. See infra section III.C.
133. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616.
134. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957); see infra note 136 and accompanying text.
135. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985); see infra note 144.
136. Description of Femininity Test, supra note 15.
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within the body and removes a sample of tissue. A determination must
be made whether this is equivalent to an extraction of bodily fluids.
In Breithaupt v. Abram,13 7 the Supreme Court ruled that a blood
sample taken from an unconscious person involved in a fatal automobile
accident was constitutional because society's interest in drunk driving
outweighed the slight intrusion of the person's body. 3 ' Although the
Court did not use the word "compelling," it held that "the individual's
right to immunity from such invasion of the body... is far outweighed
by the value of its deterrent effect .... 139
Nine years later in Schmerber v. California," , the Court reaffirmed
Breithaupt in a case involving an extraction of blood from an intoxicated
and conscious driver. 4 ' The Court held that the intrusion was "justi-
fied"' 42 because the police officer noticed "symptoms of drunkeness"'14 3
after petitioner's automobile accident. The opinion implies that the justi-
fication for the intrusion is grounded in the public's overwhelming inter-
est in highway safety. Additionally, the Court held that the test was
reasonable because the extraction of blood is "commonplace in these
days of periodic physical examinations."'"
The similarities and differences between these two cases and the gen-
der verification test are clear. An extraction of blood and tissue sample
both involve an instrument penetrating the boundaries of the human
body. Neither procedure involves great bodily discomfort.
Despite their procedural similarities, however, the reasons for the
tests are different. The nation has an overwhelming interest in keeping
its roads and highways safe from drunk drivers. This interest overrides
an individual's expectation of privacy and allows for extractions of blood.
The 10C's stated interest in using the gender verification test is to ensure
the separation of the sexes.' 45 Unlike drunk driving, this does not impli-
cate safety.
Similar to the taking of blood is the taking of urine. The court in
137. 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
138. Id. at 439.
139. Id (emphasis added).
140. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
141. Id. at 771.
142. Id at 768.
143. Id. at 769.
144. Id at 771. The Court listed factors such as the small amount extracted, the little or
no pain or risk involved, and the reasonable manner in which the test was performed, to sup-
port its holding. Cf Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985), in which the Commonwealth of
Virginia sought to compel Lee, suspected of attempting to commit armed robbery, to undergo
surgery with general anesthesia to remove a bullet. The Court held this unreasonable. "A
compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body for evidence... implicates expectations
of privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be 'unreasonable' even if
likely to produce evidence of a crime." Id. at 759.
145. See supra notes 5-8 and acccompanying text.
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Capua v. City ofPlainfield,1' however, held that a mass urinalysis of city
employees violated the Fourth Amendment.147 Among its reasons, the
court cited the reasonable expectation of privacy in the personal informa-
tion contained in bodily fluids,148 the integrity of the body, 14 9 and the
need for individualized suspicion of the person being tested.5 0
Mass urinalysis is similar to mass gender verification testing in many
ways. The IOC engages in mass testing by requiring every female who
has not already been tested to submit to the test prior to competing. A
sample of tissue from an individual's mouth may not be a bodily fluid per
se, but it consists of material which is an integral part of a person's
body-her cells. A skin cell tissue sample is similar to a blood or urine
sample because it consists of cells taken from the inside of a person's
body. Furthermore, unlike a urine test but similar to a blood test, gender
verification requires an instrument to obtain the cell sample. Thus, just
as the taking of a blood or urine sample, a taking of cell tissue from one's
mouth is a violation of the body's integrity. Justice Marshall, dissenting
in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, stated that the chem-
ical analysis of "blood and urine samples implicates strong privacy inter-
ests . . .... " Such analysis reveals medical disorders"5 2 and is a
"periscope through which [the government] can peer into an individual's
behavior in her private life, even in her own home."' 53
The court in Capua required that there be individualized suspicion,
as part of the reasonable suspicion standard.' 54 The court agreed that
the state's interest in protecting the public from impaired city employees,
such as firefighters, was "weighty."' 5 Nevertheless, the intrusion on the
firefighters' privacy was "severe,"' 56 and individualized suspicion was
therefore required.
The IOC does not employ the individualized suspicion standard, but
easily could apply it. The IOC could examine a person's outward physi-
cal appearance to decide whether there is a question about her gender.5 7
If this initial examination leads to an individualized suspicion, then the
146. 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986).
147. Id. at 1516-22.
148. Id. at 1513.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1517.
151. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 647 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
152. Id.
153. Id. (quoting Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 339 (App. D.C. 1987)).
154. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1517-18.
155. Id. at 1517.
156. Id. at 1518.
157. See infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
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IOC could require the athlete to submit to the test.
158
Based on the application of drug testing cases to the gender verifica-
tion test, the IOC performs a search which violates the athletes' reason-
able expectation of privacy. The IOC does not have a safety concern.
Although the integrity of the Olympic Games is an important issue, the
IOC does not have any facts which warrant the invasive procedure.
Therefore, no compelling reason exists to justify the use of the test, and it
is thus unreasonable.
3. Consent
A search that would otherwise be unreasonable, and therefore un-
constitutional, is nevertheless valid if consent is given. '59 In Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, the Court ruled that in order for consent to be valid,
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent
not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or
covert force. For, no matter how subtly the coercion was applied,
the resulting "consent" would be no more than a pretext for the
unjustified ... intrusion against which the Fourth Amendment is
directed. 6°
Thus, for consent not to be coerced, the individual must be able to make
a voluntary choice. The alternative must be viable, however, to avoid
coerced consent.
1 61
In the context of the gender verification test, Olympic athletes have
no viable alternative. If they refuse to take the test, they cannot compete.
They are not coerced explicitly into taking the test, but there is implied
coercion because no alternative exists if they refuse. From the perspec-
tive of an Olympic-caliber athlete, denial of a chance to compete in the
Games after she has qualified could be considered the equivalent of the
end of her career in sports. 62 Olympic qualification may be the
highpoint of an athlete's life. Therefore, refusing to take the test is not a
viable alternative for an athlete.
158. See IOG Shelyes Idea of Compulsory Physical Sex Tests, supra note 5 (regarding testing
in cases of "severe doubt"). It follows that performing a physical exam in cases of severe doubt
can only be done if individualized suspicion exists. How will such suspicion be defined? Such
a decision must be made on objective grounds, but defining how feminine a woman must ap-
pear in order to quaify as a woman is inherently subjective. See infra notes 172-74 and accom-
panying text.
159. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Rose, supra note 91, at 63-64.
160. 412 U.S. at 228; see also Rose, supra note 91, at 64.
161. Rose, supra note 91, at 64. "[IThe choice between performing an act or dying consti-
tutes coercion, since death is not a viable alternative." Id
162. Miller, supra note 54. ("'The shock to the women is overwhelming. For the most
part, they disappear from sport completely devastated, their careers cut off cruelly and ab-
ruptly."' (quoting Dr. Elizabeth Ferris, former diving champion and medical officer for the
Modem Pentathalon Association)).
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In support of its position in Schneckloth, the Court stated,
"[W]hether in a particular case an apparent consent was in fact volunta-
rily given or was in submission to an express or implied assertion of au-
thority, is a question of fact to be determined in the light of all of the
circumstances."16 3 The rules promulgated by the IOC with respect to
gender verification leave no room for an athlete to make any type of
choice. She submits to the test because without it she cannot compete.
Athough this may appear to be voluntary consent, it is anything but vol-
untary when examinined in light of all the circumstances. After years of
training for the Olympic Games, an athlete who qualifies is not going to
let a simple medical procedure that determines her sex stand in her way.
Any woman who knows she is a woman would probably view the test as
simply another administrative procedure that has to be complied with
before she is allowed to compete. This compliance in no way makes the
test constitutional, nor is it evidence of voluntary consent.
The athletes know about the test because it is in the IOC Charter
and, presumably, they hear about it from other competitors and at other
competitions. State of knowledge, however, is only one factor considered
when assessing voluntariness of consent. 164 There must be a viable alter-
native.1 65 When viewed in light of all the circumstances, Olympic ath-
letes have absolutely no choice whatsoever in the matter. It is clear from
the circumstances that a female athlete's apparent consent is in submis-
sion to the IOC's express assertion of authority.
4. The IOC's Interest1
66
In addition to examining the test from the privacy standpoint of the
athlete, we must examine the IOC's position because the gender verifica-
tion test can be considered an administrative search. Specifically, does
the IOC have a compelling interest that outweighs the athletes' right to
privacy? A two-part argument can be made for the IOC, but it will ulti-
mately fail when compared with the lack of demonstrable need for the
test.
First, from the IOC's perspective, it has a compelling interest in us-
ing the gender verification test to prevent a scandal from tainting the
Games. The IOC could argue that it is of dire importance that no im-
poster be allowed to enter the Games who has not officially qualified
based solely on their athletic ability. Hence, the need for the gender ver-
ification test.
163. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 221 (citing Justice Traynor in People v. Michael, 290 P.2d
852, 854 (1955) (emphasis added)).
164. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 223.
165. See Rose, supra note 91, at 64.
166. This includes factors that are additional to those considered in Part III.A.2.
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Second, the public has an interest in the Olympic Games because of
wide publicity through all major forms of mass media. Those watching
the Games expect them to be run in a clean, fair, and professional man-
ner. The Olympics would be reduced to a sham if men could compete in
women's events. The public interest combined with the IOC's own inter-
est as the governing body pro.yide, from the IOC's perspective, a compel-
ling interest in utilizing the gender verification test that may outweigh
the athletes' privacy.
In addition to the above concerns, the IOC might argue that another
element that needs to be examined and balanced is the method used to
carry out the gender verification test. The ultimate determination of a
search's reasonableness requires a judicious balancing of the intrusive-
ness of the search against its promotion of a compelling interest. 167 What
is reasonable depends upon how the test is administered. 168 In Capua v.
City of Plainfield, the court struck down the mass urinalysis program,
which was conducted under the surveillance of a testing official. 169 In
the context of the gender verification test, the opening of one's mouth
followed by a scraping of a tissue sample from the inside of the mouth
does not seem to be an unreasonable method when compared to the
urinalysis in Capua. The IOC's method is very similar to a simple medi-
cal procedure that routinely occurs in a doctor's office. Furthermore, for
the ultimate purpose of examining an individual's sex chromosomes, the
tissue scraping is likely to be the most efficient method. This method of
examination seems reasonable and would weigh in the IOC's favor.
The analysis, however, must be taken further. The IOC may not
have a compelling interest because according to the available facts, no-
body has ever flunked the gender verification test because "she" was
male. 170 The IOC does not release the official results of the testing, 171
and with no official verification available, the IOC cannot demonstrate a
compelling need for the test. The IOC's interest does not outweigh the
intrusion of the athletes' bodies.
An additional consideration is whether the test is justified at pre-
cisely the moment it is used. Every female athlete is tested with abso-
lutely no prior scrutiny by Olympic officials to determine if specific facts
or reasons would make the test appropriate.1 72 Thus, because each ath-
lete is indiscriminately required to take the test, no specific reasons exist
in the minds of the officials that could reasonably warrant the test.
167. O'Halloran v. University of Wash., 679 F. Supp. 997, 1002 (W.D. Wash. 1988), rev.
on other grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988).
168. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.L 1986).
169. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1514-15.
170. Majendie, supra note 4; Doyle, supra note 11.
171. Doyle, supra note 11.
172. Id
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Every woman, no matter what she looks like, must take the test. If
Olympic officials were required to have specific facts and reasons before
making an athlete take the test, they would have to examine each wo-
man's physical characteristics before deciding whether the test was war-
ranted. If a particular woman's physical appearance casts some doubt on
whether she is indeed a woman, then the officials may have a justifiable
reason to administer the test to that particular woman to ensure that she
is not male. The simple act of scraping the skin cells would then be
considered reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified
the use of the test.
The above suggestion shows that in order for the test to be justified
at the time it is used, the officials must have some suspicion that the
woman in front of them may in fact be a man, because the IOC's objec-
tive is to keep men from competing in women's events. 173 A woman
exhibiting some physical male characteristics would provide the officials
with a reason to justify using the test.
This scenario raises some serious questions regarding what stan-
dards would be used to determine that a woman does not look enough
like a woman. This would be entirely too subjective. The facts available
to the official at the moment of the search have to be such that a reason-
able person would believe the action was appropriate. Even more de-
grading than having one's chromosomes examined for proof of gender is
having a complete stranger decide a particular woman "looks" too male
to actually be a female. Even if the decision were made by a female offi-
cial, she theoretically would be following official guidelines promulgated
by the IOC for purposes of determining if a woman looks female enough
to not require testing. This is much too subjective, and proves that to
follow these theoretical guidelines would be practically impossible.' 74
C. Equal Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment states that "[n]o State shall... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."' 75
The Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states, and possibly to the
USOC. 76 In 1976, the Supreme Court in Craig v. Boren177 articulated a
middle-level scrutiny for gender-based classifications. The Court held
that the standard required that "classifications by gender must serve im-
portant governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives."'' 78 In his concurrence, Justice Powell
173. Experts Say Competitve Advantage Holds for MD Tennis Star Despite Sex Change,
supra note 7 ; de la Chapelle, Use and Misuse of Sex Chromatin, supra note 2, at 1920.
174. Miller, supra note 54 ("degrading nude parade").
175. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
176. See supra Part III.A.l.
177. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
178. Id. at 197.
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stated that the old "rational basis" '17 9 standard of review had taken on a
"sharper focus" ' when addressing a gender-based classification. Ap-
plied to the IOC, Craig v. Boren emphasizes the necessity of proving that
the gender verification test must be substantially related to achieving the
IOC's objectives.
For an equal protection analysis, the gender verification test must be
examined to see if it serves an important IOC objective, and if the test is
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. The gender
verification test presents an obstacle to female athletes with which male
athletes do not have to contend. According to the available medical liter-
ature, the test is scientifically flawed and unfair."' Furthermore, facts
show that the test does not serve an important IOC objective. The IOC's
goal in employing the gender verification test is to prevent men from
competing in women's events.18 2 Despite the unavailability of test re-
sults,1 83 there is simply a very low likelihood of fraud. 8 4 Furthermore,
according to Dr. de la Chapelle, equality among athletes is impossible to
achieve because of varying levels of natural strength among women.18
Even though the IOC's goal of equality through separation of the sexes is
important, the very low chance of fraud combined with women's varying
levels of strength prove that the gender verification test does not serve an
important IOC objective. Although a man has never been caught trying
to enter a women's event, it is possible that a man may try to enter a
women's event some day. Based on the past history of the Olympics,
however, this is unlikely to happen. The IOC could argue that the test is
necessary to ensure a scandal-free Olympic Games."8 6 However, Dr.
Robert Voy, director of sports medicine for the United States Olympic
179. d at 211.
180. Id
181. Supra notes 49-60 and accompanying text.
182. Supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
183. Doyle, supra note 11.
184. In 1967, a Polish sprinter named Eva Klobukowska, who had competed as a woman
and won two medals in the 1964 Olympics (before the gender verification test was used), was
discovered to be a man and stripped of his medals. Doctors: Sex Test to be Done, Done Better
at World Indoor Athletics Championships, XINHUA GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE,
Mar. 2, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, XINHUA File; Majendie, supra note 4. See
also Bassis, supra note 10, at 371.
In other instances, two Soviet women who won medals in the 1960 and 1964 Olympics
refused to compete rather than submit to testing. See Klein, supra note 12.
Further research did not locate any other instances in which a medal-winning athlete's
sex may have been in doubt.
185. De la Chapelle, Gender Verification, supra note 2, at 1265.
186. Although there may be some validity to this argument, one need only look at the Ben
Johnson scandal to realize that drug tests to prevent artificial athletic enhancement are needed,
while other types of tests are not. Ben Johnson was stripped of his gold medal when he was
found to have taken muscle producing hormones.
Spring 19921
960 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 19:937
Committee in 1986, discounted gender verification. 187 Gender verifica-




The gender verification test requires an examination from the point
of view of the individual athletes, and from the point of view of the IOC,
which has the best interests of the Olympics in mind. The two constitu-
tional arguments regarding the Fourth Amendment, and equal protec-
tion, require meticulous balancing of the interests of the athletes and the
IOC. The equal protection argument can be resolved in the athletes'
favor, because the IOC will not be able to prove that the gender verifica-
tion test serves an important governmental interest.189 The outcome of
the Fourth Amendment argument with respect to unreasonable search is
not as clear. When it is broken down into its individual components and
analyzed, the most striking aspect is not the search or the privacy expec-
tations or the consent. It is the IOC's compelling interest in maintaining
a scandal-free Olympic Games 90 coupled with the enormous public in-
terest involved. 91
Despite the Fourth Amendment and equal protection arguments
against the test, some may argue that the integrity of the Olympic Games
is too important to dislodge the test. If the test were abandoned and a
single male athlete was able to perpetrate fraud upon the Olympics by
competing in a women's event, the Olympics could possibly lose some of
its integrity as the premier showcase for international sport. Because the
likelihood of this occurrence is so low, however, that possibility does not
outweigh the violation of the athletes' constitutional rights. Therefore,
the remote instance of fraud is outweighed by the female athletes' interest
in having their dignity restored. Furthermore, integrity of a sports event
187. In his statement, Dr. Voy emphasized the need for drug testing: "[W]e're more con-
cerned about the use of anabolic steroids than we are about the very rare woman with a genetic
abnormality." Doyle, supra note 11.
188. In a more recent equal protection case, Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718 (1981), the Court held that women did not lack opportunities in nursing which would
justify a state-supported all-female university, and therefore a male applicant's right to the
equal protection of the laws was violated. IaL at 729-31. The Court stated that the party
seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis on their gender must carry
the burden of proof. Id. at 724. The burden is met only by showing that the gender-based
classification serves "'important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means
employed' are 'substantially related to the acheivement of those objectives.'" Id. (quoting
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)). The gender verification test
is a gender-based classification which, as shown above, does not serve an important IOC
objective.
189. See supra notes 181-88 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
191. Id.
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is simply not as important as fundamental personal liberties. Because
neither retention of the test nor its complete abandonment are advisable,
the best way of reconciling the IOC's interest with the dignity of female
athletes would be to use a different type of gender verification test.192
Such a test would examine the eight factors recognized by the legal com-
munity as being determinative of sex. 193 This approach would take into
consideration not only a person's chromosomes, but her external appear-
ance and her own gender identity. 194 Such an approach supports the idea
that an athlete who perceives herself as a woman and wants the world to
perceive her in the same way, is a woman no matter what her genetic
make-up. This approach satisfies the interests of both the IOC and the
individual athletes.
192. During the Winter Olympics in Albertville, the International Amateur Athletic Fed-
eration (IAAF) announced it was officially replacing the Barr body test with a simple physical
exam. Gina Kolata, Track Federation Urges End to Gene Test for Femaleness, THE NEw
YORK TIMES, Feb. 12, 1992, at 1. "'What they really care about are real men who masquer-
ade as women....' And to find them... 'it is a whole lot simpler to just look at anatomy than
to go through genetic shenanigans.'" Iad (quoting Dr. Richard Berkowitz, chairman of obstet-
rics, gynecology and reproductive science at Mount Sinai Medical School). The IAAF is urg-
ing that a physical exam be used for all international competitions. Idr See also Michael D.
Lemonick, Genetic Tests Under Fire, TIME, Feb. 24, 1992, at 65; supra note 4.
A physical exam, however, raises serious concerns. Some athletes may feel that a genital
examination by a stranger is much more intrusive than a cheek scraping. Furthermore, some
standard will have to be followed to enable a doctor to determine if an athlete's genitals look
female enough. This raises questions of subjectivity. The IAAF's proposal, while seeking to
implement a test which is more fair and won't disqualify from competition women who have
abnormal sex chromosomes, seems to be a rather backward proposition. See Kolata, supra.
Indeed , this type of test was used before the Barr body test, and was discarded because it was
less scientific and degrading. Id Furthermore, the potential for abuse exists. Pat Rico, a
member of the IAAFs women's committee, stated that she knew of athletes who competed in
the August 1991 World Track and Field Championships in Tokyo "whose sex verification test
consisted of 'pulling up their shirts."' Id
193. Bassis, supra note 10, at 374; David, supra note 36, at 290-91.
194. "It might be thought that the easiest solution to a situation in which there are conflict-
ing indications of sex is that the classification should be determined by a majority of the factors
.... The eighth factor, gender identity, is arguably the most important." David, supra note
36, at 292. David does not assume that all eight factors are of equal weight. Id. Cf Anony-
mous v. Mellon, 398 N.Y.S.2d 99, 102 (1977) (no single criteria is determinative of sex).
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